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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
CLARENCE ELMER GARREN,
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 45631
Ada County Case No. CR01-17-32853

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

Has Garren failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing discretion when it
sentenced him to 20 years with five years determinate upon his conviction for sexual exploitation
of a child?
ARGUMENT
Garren Has Failed Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
A.

Introduction
A woman contacted law enforcement about Garren’s questionable social media behavior.

(PSI, pp. 3, 95, 99-100.) With her consent, law enforcement continued contact with Garren posing
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as the woman. (Id.) Garren communicated his sexual desires for young children and sent images
of children under ten years old in sexual poses. (PSI, pp. 95-97, 100-10.)
The state charged Garren with two counts of sexual exploitation of a child. (R., pp. 2223.) Garren pled guilty to one count pursuant to a plea agreement whereby the state dismissed the
second count and agreed to recommend a sentence of 20 years with five years determinate. (R.,
pp. 26-34; Tr., p. 5, L. 18 – p. 6, L. 21.) The district court imposed a sentence of 20 years with
five years determinate. (R., pp. 39-41; Tr., p. 40, Ls. 18-24.) Garren filed a timely notice of
appeal. (R., pp. 43-44.)

B.

Standard Of Review
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard considering the

defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing
State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002); State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201,
159 P.3d 838 (2007)). It is presumed that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant's
probable term of confinement. Id. (citing State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999)).
Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it
is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing
State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)).
When considering whether the sentence was an abuse of discretion, “this Court
considers: (1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within the boundaries of its discretion
and consistently with the legal standards applicable; and (3) whether the trial court
reached its decision by an exercise of reason.”
State v. Fisher, 162 Idaho 465, 398 P.3d 839, 842 (2017) (quoting State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828,
834, 264 P.3d 935, 941 (2011)).
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C.

Garren Has Shown No Abuse Of The District Court’s Discretion
To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion, the appellant must establish

that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was excessive. State v. Farwell, 144
Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007). In determining whether the appellant met his burden,
the court considers the entire sentence but, because the decision to release him on parole is
exclusively the province of the executive branch, presumes that the determinate portion will be the
period of actual incarceration. State v. Bailey, 161 Idaho 887, 895, 392 P.3d 1228, 1236 (2017)
(citing Oliver, 144 Idaho at 726, 170 P.3d at 391). To establish that the sentence was excessive,
he must demonstrate that reasonable minds could not conclude the sentence was appropriate to
accomplish the sentencing goals of protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution.
Farwell, 144 Idaho at 736, 170 P.3d at 401. A sentence is reasonable “‘if it appears necessary to
accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals
of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.’” Bailey, 161 Idaho at 895–96, 392 P.3d at 1236–37
(quoting State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d 621, 628 (2015)).
The district court recognized its discretion and correctly articulated the applicable legal
standard. (Tr., p. 39, L. 15 – p. 40, L. 7.) The district court specifically stated it had “considered
all the facts and circumstances of the crime,” Garren’s “prior criminal history,” the “plea bargain
agreement,” Garren’s “character,” his “condition and attitude,” the PSI, the psychosexual
evaluation, the “[i]mpact on the victims, such as I can sort that out,” the “various aggravating and
mitigating factors,” the “arguments and recommendations of the attorneys,” and Garren’s
allocution. (Tr., p. 40, Ls. 8-17.) It specifically rejected Garren’s request that the court retain
jurisdiction, citing a “host of reasons” including Garren’s numerous prior felony convictions, the
evaluator’s conclusion that Garren was a high risk to reoffend with child pornography and a modest
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risk to sexually abuse children, Garren’s amenability to sex offender treatment including his
personality disorders and pedophilia, his family support, and the lack of credibility of Garren’s
denials. (Tr., p. 41, L. 13 – p. 42, L. 23.) The record thus establishes the district court acted within
the boundaries of its discretion.
Garren argues the district court failed to give “proper weight” to “his family support,” his
expression of remorse, and his amenability to sex offender treatment. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 4-5.)
As noted, the district court did consider these factors. Because the weighing of these factors was
within the district court’s discretion, Garren’s argument that the district court should have given
greater weight to mitigating factors fails to show an abuse of discretion.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court.
DATED this 14th day of May, 2018.

__/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen_________________
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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